Author: Gilson Guilherme Miguel Ângelo — Angolan thinker and politician.
Editorial affiliation: GAESEMA EDITORA — Windhoek, Namibia.
Article type: scholarly essay analysing history, economics and public policy.
Reference time: 25 October 2026, at 12:32 p.m. Windhoek time.
Editorial status: manuscript for assessment.
Abstract
This article examines Lula’s presidential victories in 2002, 2006 and 2022 and their relationship with economic growth, social inclusion and policy continuity. It combines a narrative review, electoral documentation and official indicators with an interpretation of the existential realities of work, food, health, education and sovereignty. The selected historical series shows economic expansion during the first two terms, interrupted in 2009, and growth in the completed years from 2023 to 2025. Recent social indicators identify falling poverty and unemployment without establishing that the president alone caused these outcomes. The study distinguishes policies created under Lula, earlier initiatives and recommendations for institutional preservation. It examines social protection, education, health, infrastructure, agriculture, industry, environmental protection, economic stability, transparency and diplomatic diversification. In Gilson Guilherme Miguel Ângelo’s view, supporting Lula’s continuity means defending a development project and active participation in BRICS rather than classifying individuals as good or bad presidents. It concludes that preserving achievements requires evaluation, sustainable funding and cooperation among institutions. BRICS broadens international options; turning them into welfare also depends on domestic policies and Brazilian democracy.
Keywords: Brazilian elections; Lula administrations; Development; Public policy; BRICS; Democracy.
Resumo
Este artigo analisa as vitórias presidenciais de Lula em 2002, 2006 e 2022 e a sua relação com crescimento económico, inclusão social e continuidade de políticas públicas. Combina revisão narrativa, documentação eleitoral e indicadores oficiais com uma interpretação das realidades existenciais do trabalho, alimentação, saúde, educação e soberania. A série histórica seleccionada mostra expansão económica nos dois primeiros mandatos, com interrupção em 2009, e crescimento nos anos completos de 2023 a 2025. Os indicadores sociais recentes identificam redução da pobreza e do desemprego, sem autorizar atribuição exclusiva dos resultados ao presidente. O estudo distingue políticas criadas nos governos Lula, iniciativas anteriores e recomendações de preservação institucional. Examina protecção social, ensino, saúde, infra-estrutura, agricultura, indústria, ambiente, estabilidade económica, transparência e diversificação diplomática. Na visão de Gilson Guilherme Miguel Ângelo, apoiar a continuidade de Lula significa defender um projecto de desenvolvimento e participação activa nos BRICS, e não classificar pessoas como bons ou maus presidentes. Conclui-se que a preservação de conquistas exige avaliação, financiamento sustentável e cooperação entre instituições. Os BRICS ampliam opções internacionais; a capacidade de transformar essas opções em bem-estar depende também das políticas internas e da democracia brasileira.
Palavras-chave: Eleições brasileiras; Governos Lula; Desenvolvimento; Políticas públicas; BRICS; Democracia.
1. Introduction
An election is experienced through the job a family seeks, the cost of food, the quality of schooling and the possibility of imagining a dignified future. These are existential realities: the concrete conditions through which a community experiences security, freedom, recognition and the capacity to determine its own destiny. In this article, the term denotes an interpretive category defined by the author, rather than a statistical index.
In Gilson Guilherme Miguel Ângelo’s view, Brazil’s debate must ask what place the country wishes to occupy in the world. Polarisation becomes an existential crisis when society loses the ability to recognise a national interest that can survive competition between parties. In this context, BRICS should be examined as an opportunity to participate in shaping the international order.
The central argument is that Brazil, as a founding member, holds a position whose significance deserves to be explained to the Brazilian people: it participates in a framework of cooperation that it helped build. For the author, weakening that participation because of partisan antagonism would put at risk opportunities that belong to society, rather than to one government alone.
Gilson Guilherme Miguel Ângelo’s political criterion is explicit: he supports those who commit to deepening Brazilian participation in BRICS. The issue is not to divide candidates into “good presidents” and “bad presidents”, but to distinguish projects for Brazil’s international engagement. In the author’s reading, Lula represents continuity in building a multipolar order, whereas the Bolsonarist project represented by Flávio Bolsonaro remains tied to an orientation inherited from the past, centred on political proximity to Washington. “The past” expresses Ângelo’s political judgement of that orientation; it is not a scientific classification of the individual or all his proposals.
Ângelo advocates Lula’s victory as a political choice favourable to continuing this orientation. His position rests on his assessment of the president’s diplomatic experience and the trust built with BRICS partners. It does not, however, assume that every government in the grouping shares a left-wing ideology or that cooperation depends exclusively on one individual. The proposed objective is to turn government leadership into lasting state capacity.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Right and left: distinctions without caricatures
Bobbio (1996) explains the persistence of the distinction between left and right primarily through attitudes towards equality. Broadly speaking, the left tends to attach greater importance to reducing socially produced inequalities; the right tends to place greater value on institutional continuity and differences regarded as legitimate. These are historical categories: they do not mean that the entire right rejects social justice or that the entire left rejects private property.
For this analysis, the economic dimension must be considered alongside attitudes towards political freedom. An actor may propose extensive state intervention while respecting competitive elections. Another may defend markets while seeking to limit pluralism. The size of the state and commitment to democracy are therefore different variables.
| Political current | Frequent emphases | Relevant political criterion |
| Democratic left | Redistribution, social rights and public services | Accepts pluralism, opposition and electoral alternation |
| Democratic right | Private enterprise, property and institutional continuity | Accepts pluralism, opposition and electoral alternation |
| Antidemocratic extreme left | Revolutionary rupture or political monopoly justified in the name of equality | Accepts suppressing competition, rights or opposition in the name of its project |
| Antidemocratic extreme right | Authoritarian order, exclusionary nationalism and social hierarchy | Accepts suppressing competition, rights or opposition in the name of its project |
Source: the article’s analytical synthesis, drawing on Bobbio (1996) and Mudde’s (2007) discussion of democracy and the radical right. The first two rows describe broad political families; the last two define antidemocratic types without automatically classifying Brazilian candidates.
“Radical” and “extremist” should not be treated as universally interchangeable terms. In Mudde’s (2007) analysis, the populist radical right may participate in electoral competition while simultaneously coming into tension with liberal democracy, particularly minority rights and limits on majority power. Rejection of democracy itself constitutes a further problem. On the left, a proposal for profound transformation does not, by itself, establish support for violence or one-party rule.
2.2. Polarisation and the crisis of democratic coexistence
McCoy, Rahman and Somer (2018) analyse pernicious polarisation as a relational dynamic that organises society into hostile camps. The danger depends on more than the distance between policy platforms: it grows when group identity allows people to justify abuses by their own side and deny legitimacy to opponents.
This approach makes Ângelo’s “existential crisis” amenable to investigation. Such an investigation would need to track tolerance of violence, institutional trust, acceptance of electoral defeat and willingness to uphold opponents’ rights over time. A voting-intention poll does not, on its own, measure these dimensions. An electorally divided society may retain functioning institutions; a large majority may also support authoritarian measures.
2.3. Autonomy through diversification
Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) examine the first Lula administration’s foreign policy through the concept of autonomy through diversification. Its central idea is to broaden partners and negotiating options, reducing asymmetries without requiring a break with developed countries. This is a useful historical reference whose application to 2026 requires new evidence.
In this article, “strategic autonomy” means the capacity to formulate national priorities and negotiate costs, benefits and conditions with different partners. It does not mean isolation, automatic neutrality or hostility towards the United States. It also requires avoiding excessive dependence on China or any other market.
3. Methodology
The study adopts a narrative review and qualitative documentary analysis. It draws on work on polarisation and diplomatic autonomy, institutional documents from BRICS and the New Development Bank (NDB), records from Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies and Senate, and the definition of the United Nations’ purposes. It does not claim to provide an exhaustive survey of the literature.
In this expanded version, the analysis of existential realities is accompanied by historical election results and development indicators. It examines confirmed victories in 2002, 2006 and 2022. It does not attribute a victory in 2026 to Lula: the reference cutoff, 12:32 p.m. in Windhoek, precedes the opening of nationwide runoff voting in Brazil. The policies discussed constitute a broad selection of structural priorities, rather than an inventory of every Brazilian administrative measure.
Documentary facts, the author’s political position and proposals for the future are distinguished. GDP figures for 2003–2010 are reproduced from a single historical IBGE publication covering the fourth quarter of 2016, avoiding the combination of different versions of a series. They are not presented as a fresh extraction from the 2026 database. For 2023–2025, recent official releases identified in the references are used. Averages and cumulative changes are descriptive calculations without causal adjustment. Unemployment surveys using different methodologies are not combined into a single series. In this essay, a “higher standing” means greater productive, technological and negotiating capacity accompanied by improved living conditions. Participation in a grouping is a possible means of achieving these goals, rather than proof that they have already been achieved.
4. Results and Discussion: Electoral Victories and Economic Transformation
4.1. Three victories, three democratic contexts
The historical focus is on elections Lula actually won. The results distinguish the transfer of power in 2002, re-election in 2006 and return to office in 2022. Each victory conferred a democratic mandate within constitutional limits; none removes the right to opposition or establishes in advance the success of every policy.
| Election and runoff date | Opponent | Votes for Lula | Share of valid votes | Term beginning |
| 2002 — 27 October | José Serra | 52,793,364 | 61.27% | 2003–2006 |
| 2006 — 29 October | Geraldo Alckmin | 58,295,042 | 60.83% | 2007–2010 |
| 2022 — 30 October | Jair Bolsonaro | 60,345,999 | 50.90% | 2023–2026 |
Sources: TSE, direct-election record; TRE-MG, previous election results; TSE (2022); confirmation of the 2002 proclamation in Folha de S.Paulo (2002). Percentages rounded to two decimal places. The 2002 date is the polling date; one historical record in the TSE glossary gives a different date and was therefore not used to establish the day of voting.
The comparison shows that the largest absolute vote count does not necessarily coincide with the largest percentage: the electorate and turnout change between elections. Ângelo’s interpretation is that these victories should be examined through the commitments and results they enabled, rather than as permanent authorisation for any officeholder.
4.2. The 2002 victory: social inclusion within a stabilised economy
Victory over José Serra opened the way to the first Lula administration. The challenge was to combine economic confidence and social integration in a country marked by longstanding inequalities. This did not begin in an institutional vacuum: the Real Plan and the fight against inflation preceded the administration, as did the SUS and several social policies. The Central Bank identifies the stabilisation initiated with the Real Plan as a fundamental change in Brazil’s economy (BCB, n.d.).
During the first term, initiatives were organised that became central to Lula’s political identity, including Bolsa Família, the Food Acquisition Programme and Prouni. These policies address different needs: income to live on, markets for production and opportunities to study. An analysis of continuity must ask whether these functions remain necessary and how their implementation can be improved.
The existential significance of the change lies in broadening people’s ability to participate. A family with a more predictable income can organise consumption and travel; a farmer with marketing channels can plan production; a student with access to higher education can acquire new qualifications. These mechanisms are plausible economic interpretations, rather than this article’s own estimates of each programme’s impact.
4.3. Growth in 2003–2010: expansion, crisis and recovery
| Year | Real GDP change | Position in the government cycle |
| 2003 | 1.1% | First year of the first term |
| 2004 | 5.8% | First term |
| 2005 | 3.2% | First term |
| 2006 | 4.0% | Year of the first re-election |
| 2007 | 6.1% | Beginning of the second term |
| 2008 | 5.1% | Second term |
| 2009 | −0.1% | Impact of the international financial crisis |
| 2010 | 7.5% | Recovery and end of the second term |
Source: IBGE, Quarterly National Accounts, fourth quarter of 2016, Figure II.1, p. 13. Reproduction of an identified historical release. Other publications may report revised figures or earlier versions, particularly for 2004, 2008 and 2009.
The arithmetic mean of the reported rates is approximately 3.53% for 2003–2006 and 4.65% for 2007–2010. Multiplying the annual growth factors indicates cumulative expansion of approximately 37.48% over the eight years: the product of (1 + annual rate/100), minus one. This measures growth in the economy’s total volume of output, rather than each person’s income or a nominal monetary value.
Ângelo’s favourable political reading finds a concrete basis here: output increased substantially between the beginning and end of the first two administrations. However, the series does not show uninterrupted growth. The 2009 contraction and 2010 recovery must be presented together; selecting 2010 alone would give an incomplete picture.
The performance resulted from a combination of domestic decisions and the international context, including conditions affecting trade, credit, investment and demand. The table does not identify the share attributable exclusively to Lula or BRICS. The first BRIC summit took place in 2009; it would be historically incorrect to explain all the growth beginning in 2003 through the subsequent existence of that forum.
4.4. The 2006 victory: policy continuity and expansion
Re-election against Geraldo Alckmin continued the government’s policy direction. It does not establish that every voter approved every programme: votes bring together diverse assessments and motivations. Nevertheless, continuity in leadership created political conditions for deepening social and investment initiatives.
The second term coincided with the creation of the PAC in 2007, the Federal Institutes in 2008 and Minha Casa, Minha Vida in 2009. These are distinct instruments: infrastructure planning, scientific and vocational education, and access to housing. Legal establishment does not prove successful implementation of every project; assessing results requires distinguishing announcements, contracts, delivery and service quality.
There is also a lesson in democratic coexistence: Lula’s opponent in 2006 became his vice-presidential running mate in 2022. Cooperation between former competitors shows that electoral disagreements need not prevent future agreements. From Ângelo’s perspective, this is a way to make useful policies less vulnerable to destruction driven by polarisation.
4.5. The 2022 victory and the completed years of the third term
The third presidential victory came in a much closer contest than the previous two. The TSE confirmed the final 2022 result. For this article, the victory signifies the legitimacy of a new mandate, accompanied by the obligation to govern for the whole of society, including citizens who voted for the opponent.
| Completed year of the third term | Real GDP growth |
| 2023 | 3.2% |
| 2024 | 3.4% |
| 2025 | 2.3% |
Sources: IBGE releases on GDP in 2024 and 2025; IFI/Senate (2024), confirming the revision for 2023. National accounts data are subject to revision. Annual growth is not mixed with quarterly rates, and forecasts for 2026 are not treated as completed results.
The three rates indicate cumulative growth of approximately 9.16%, calculated by multiplying the annual factors. The arithmetic mean is 2.97%. The slowdown in 2025 must also be acknowledged. Increased output is a relevant result, but assessing its social significance requires examining distribution, living costs, employment and service quality.
Differences in growth rates between the first two terms and the third cannot be interpreted without considering productive structures, financial conditions, demographics and international shocks. Comparing averages describes performance; it is not a controlled experiment on presidents’ personal competence.
4.6. Growth reaching people’s lives: employment and poverty reduction
According to PNAD Contínua, the annual unemployment rate fell from 6.6% in 2024 to 5.6% in 2025, the lowest value in the series beginning in 2012. Employment reached 103 million people. At the same time, the annual informality rate of 38.1% in 2025 shows that improvement did not eliminate precarious employment (IBGE, 2026b).
The Summary of Social Indicators reports that the population share living in poverty fell from 27.3% in 2023 to 23.1% in 2024, using the US$6.85 PPP poverty line adopted in that publication. The decline corresponds to 8.6 million people. The monetary value is a methodological poverty benchmark, not a current exchange-rate quotation (IBGE, 2025b).
The FAO/UN communication on Brazil’s exit from the Hunger Map in 2025 reports an average prevalence of undernourishment below 2.5% in 2022–2024. This does not mean hunger was absent. The indicator uses a three-year average, and 2022 precedes the third term; the first exit, announced in 2014, likewise cannot be dated as an event during Lula’s presidency (ONU Brasil, 2025).
These results help support the argument that development must be experienced in people’s lives. Food, employment and predictable income make economic participation more tangible. Regional, racial and gender inequalities remain and can be hidden by national averages. The article does not estimate how much poverty reduction resulted from transfers, employment or other factors.
4.7. What the victories teach about preservation and change
The historical synthesis brings together electoral legitimacy, expanding activity and observed social improvements. Ângelo interprets these elements as grounds for preserving public functions that broaden opportunities. Preservation does not require freezing rules, branding or administrative arrangements: it requires protecting rights and outcomes while correcting shortcomings.
In the author’s reading, support for Lula in 2026 should be tied to the continuity of this project and deeper engagement in BRICS. The criterion remains a development orientation, rather than a moral classification of candidates. History provides reasons for a political preference; it does not remove the need to scrutinise whoever is elected.
5. Results and Discussion: BRICS and Autonomy
5.1. Brazil as a founder: a position that needs to be understood
Brazil belongs to the founding core of BRIC, whose first summit of heads of state took place in 2009, alongside Russia, India and China. South Africa’s subsequent participation gave rise to the name BRICS (BRICS Brasil, n.d.). This historical position gives Brazil experience in coordination and diplomatic continuity; it does not grant unlimited power over other members.
For Ângelo, the existential significance of that status lies in recognition: the country can present itself as a participant in formulating international proposals, rather than merely accepting options designed by others. Being a founder carries a responsibility to propose, negotiate and contribute. Citizens need to understand this status through its practical consequences, not diplomatic ceremonies alone.
A clear public explanation should connect foreign policy with everyday life: how can a particular form of cooperation improve transport, broaden access to technology, support production and create job opportunities? Without this connection, international prominence will remain distant from people’s needs.
5.2. Why continued engagement in BRICS could raise Brazil’s standing
Continued active engagement can broaden financing options, technological dialogue and negotiations with emerging economies. The New Development Bank was established by the five founding countries to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development. Its existence demonstrates that cooperation has produced a concrete institutional instrument (NDB, n.d.).
In this article’s interpretation, its significance for Brazil lies in having more alternatives for organising national projects. Diversifying channels can improve the country’s negotiating position; actual benefits depend on lending conditions, implementation and outcomes. Financing also creates obligations: it must be assessed by its contribution to development and the borrower’s repayment capacity.
| Existential reality | Possible contribution of cooperation | Condition for generating benefits in Brazil |
| Work and income | New projects and productive relationships | Skilled employment, local linkages and good working conditions |
| Technological autonomy | Joint research and industrial partnerships | Domestic learning, innovation and maintenance capabilities |
| Infrastructure and dignity | More options for organising investment | Useful projects, transparent procurement and responsible implementation |
| Economic sovereignty | Diversification of partners and markets | Capacity to negotiate without excessive dependence |
| International recognition | Participation in formulating proposals | Diplomatic coordination and consistent commitments |
Source: the article’s interpretive analysis. These are conditional possibilities, not demonstrated outcomes or promises of approved financing.
In Ângelo’s view, the desirable higher standing would be that of a Brazil that also sells knowledge, technology and higher-value-added products; negotiates without subordination; and converts its international presence into well-being. BRICS can contribute to that trajectory, but transformation requires education, science, productivity, administrative capacity and democratic institutions at home.
5.3. BRICS and the transformation of international economic policies
The author interprets the rise of BRICS as part of the search for an economic architecture that better recognises emerging countries. The grouping provides a forum for coordination and complementary development instruments. This dynamic can change negotiating priorities and strengthen the voice of countries that regard their international representation as insufficient.
However, there is no single BRICS economic policy that has replaced all others. Its members have different interests and models. Cooperation requires negotiating these differences. The grouping’s strength must be examined through its capacity to reach decisions and implement commitments, as well as through the size of the participating economies.
In this sense, Brazil can use BRICS to propose alternatives while continuing to engage with the United States, the European Union and other partners. The principle advocated is to broaden choices. Replacing one dependency with another would weaken the purpose of autonomy on which this proposal rests.
5.4. Comparison with the UN: economic influence and international mandate
The assertion that BRICS already exceeds the UN’s capacity is not a verifiable conclusion without defining the capacity being compared. The UN is neither a national economy nor a trading bloc; its membership includes the BRICS countries themselves. Adding the economies of a subset and comparing them with the organisation that also includes them does not establish an institutional hierarchy.
The United Nations Charter assigns the organisation purposes involving international peace and security, friendly relations, cooperation and the promotion of human rights. BRICS is a forum for coordination among particular states. The NDB has a development-financing mandate. These are different functions (ONU, 1945; NDB, n.d.).
Ângelo’s argument can be stated more precisely: BRICS seeks to address shortcomings in representation and financing that the author identifies in the international order. In specific areas, it can create complementary initiatives and exert pressure for change. This does not establish that it replaces the UN or has generally superior capacity.
Brazilian parliamentary records from 2025 show BRICS participants advocating changes in international institutions and the United Nations system. This position supports discussion of governance reform, rather than the conclusion that the UN no longer has a role (Câmara dos Deputados, 2025).
5.5. Supporting a project: commitment to BRICS
In Gilson Guilherme Miguel Ângelo’s political assessment, Lula needs to win to continue rapprochement and consolidate the diplomatic trust the author associates with his leadership and the Brazilian left’s internationalist tradition. This is an explicit electoral endorsement, justified by the preservation of a strategy considered favourable to the national interest.
The literature on autonomy through diversification helps explain this preference: broadening partners can strengthen negotiating capacity without breaking relations with other centres of power (Vigevani; Cepaluni, 2007). Personal trust may facilitate dialogue; its institutional value depends on implementable agreements, competent teams and commitments maintained over time.
This trust must be distinguished from ideological identity. BRICS is not an organisation exclusive to the left. Its diversity requires cooperation between states with different institutions and orientations. The author’s argument becomes more coherent when it defends Lula’s ability to negotiate in this environment without assuming uniform partisan affinity among all members.
The preference is therefore tied to a verifiable commitment rather than unconditional personal loyalty. For the author, another leader who consistently defended this participation could be assessed by the same criterion; a supported leader who abandoned that commitment would have to be criticised.
The challenge of continuity in government would be to turn diplomatic capital into national results and build an institutional foundation capable of surviving presidential succession. Supporting Lula, from this perspective, means defending a policy direction and demanding its implementation, rather than assigning the president sole responsibility for guaranteeing Brazil’s future.
5.6. From the executive to Parliament: an engagement already under way
Parliamentary engagement with BRICS is more than an idea for the future. Brazil’s National Congress hosted the 11th BRICS Parliamentary Forum from 3 to 5 June 2025, with an agenda covering cooperation and governance. An institutional foundation therefore already exists and can be strengthened (Câmara dos Deputados, 2025).
Ângelo proposes making this experience a more lasting relationship. Parliament can promote public debate, monitor commitments, compare results and examine the domestic dimension of international initiatives. Democratic continuity requires discussion and scrutiny, including the possibility of disagreeing over particular projects.
As a political agenda, the author proposes hearings with universities, workers and businesses; accessible presentations of opportunities; assessments of costs and benefits; and monitoring of results. These are recommendations made by the essay, rather than descriptions of measures already adopted or a legal opinion on constitutional powers concerning each procedure.
By making the effects of cooperation understandable, debate can shift from loyalty to a leader towards the quality of a policy. At that level, founding membership becomes an institutional asset administered by government on behalf of society as a whole.
5.7. Bringing the BRICS agenda to the right and the extreme right
Ângelo’s expression “bringing BRICS into the extreme right” is understood as a proposal to broaden knowledge and discussion of cooperation across different political currents. The objective is to build recognition of the national interest while preserving pluralism, criticism and freedom of electoral choice.
The discussion can show how responsible financing, markets and technological development relate to priorities supported by different sectors. This process does not require conservatives to become left-wing or the left to abandon its identity. It requires examining concrete decisions and accepting that opponents may agree on particular issues.
There is a precedent for dialogue extending beyond a single party: coverage of the 2025 forum identifies leaders and coordinators from different parties, including PT, PP, Republicanos and União Brasil. This diversity does not prove that the extreme right has endorsed the grouping, but it shows a parliamentary base broader than the left alone (Senado Federal, 2025).
The democratic boundary must remain explicit: foreign-policy consensus cannot justify tolerance of violence or the suppression of rights. The international agenda should bring citizens together through verifiable arguments. A state policy matures when it can be critically examined and remain useful under different governments.
5.8. Risks of a wasted opportunity
For Ângelo, the existential risk is that Brazil reduces its participation because of polarisation and loses space to propose initiatives, build knowledge and negotiate alternatives. This is a possible scenario whose occurrence depends on future decisions. A change of government does not automatically eliminate founding status or all existing relationships.
The opposite risk would be accepting unfavourable commitments in the name of unconditional trust in BRICS. Membership does not remove the need to assess costs, technological autonomy, transparency and social responsibility. Sovereignty must apply in relations with every power or grouping.
The alternative advocated by the author is continued active, selective and demanding engagement: cooperating to strengthen Brazilian capabilities while retaining the freedom to negotiate, correct decisions and reject conditions contrary to the public interest.
6. Policies Brazil Needs to Preserve and Improve Beyond BRICS
6.1. A national agenda across different areas
The relationship with BRICS is only one part of a development strategy. Without domestic capabilities, diplomacy broadens contacts but does not ensure lasting benefits. The following table sets out the preservation agenda advocated in this essay. It is a normative proposal by the author: including a policy does not mean that all its instruments have already demonstrated equal effectiveness.
| Area | Function to preserve | Priority improvement |
| Combating hunger and protecting income | Preventing deprivation and supporting access to rights | Reliable registration, integrated services and productive inclusion |
| Work and purchasing power | Decent employment, skills and predictability | Formalisation, productivity and reduced precarity |
| SUS and medicines | Universal access and continuity of care | Primary care, waiting-list management and supplies |
| Basic and higher education | Learning and access with support to remain in education | Quality, completion and links to research |
| Technical education and science | Productive and technological capabilities | Laboratories, research and links to social needs |
| Housing and sanitation | Dignified housing, water and a healthy environment | Suitable locations and associated services |
| Infrastructure | Territorial integration and lower costs | Project appraisal, maintenance and climate resilience |
| Family farming and food security | Diversified production and food supply | Responsible credit, technical assistance and marketing |
| Industry and innovation | Higher value added and autonomy | Targets, learning and evaluation of support |
| Environment and climate | Forests, water, biodiversity and security | Monitoring, enforcement and adaptation |
| Energy | Security of supply and transition | Efficiency, innovation and affordable access |
| Economic stability | Controlled inflation and sustainable finances | Planning, transparency and spending evaluation |
| Transparency and oversight | Preventing misuse and correcting errors | Access to information and institutional autonomy |
| Democracy and rights | Participation, pluralism and alternation in power | Rejection of violence and respect for results |
| Diversified foreign policy | Broader markets and cooperation options | Reciprocity and autonomy towards all partners |
| Cooperation across levels of government | Implementation responsive to local needs | Coordination among the federal government, states and municipalities |
Source: the article’s analytical proposal, drawing on documentation cited in the following subsections. The table is neither a ranking of proven impact nor an exhaustive inventory of Brazilian policies.
6.2. Social protection, food and valuing work
Bolsa Família, reorganised by Law No. 14,601/2023, links income transfers with access to services. The priority advocated is to preserve protection for vulnerable families through accurate identification, follow-up and transitions that do not arbitrarily penalise improved income. This public function should survive changes of name or government (Senado Federal, 2023a).
The PAA, created in 2003, connects food acquisition with family farming (MDS, n.d.). In this essay’s interpretation, combating hunger requires both protecting those who need to consume and creating conditions for those who produce. The policy should avoid waste and ensure that purchasing and distribution reach their intended beneficiaries.
Law No. 14,663/2023 established a policy for increasing the real value of the minimum wage. The principle of protecting purchasing power deserves continuing debate, alongside productivity and sustainability. This article does not reproduce an adjustment formula as an unchangeable rule or one fully applicable in 2026; subsequent rules must be considered in any operational calculation (Senado Federal, 2023b).
6.3. Health as the capacity to live and produce
The SUS is a constitutional achievement predating Lula. Preserving it means guaranteeing a universal right without attributing its creation to a government that took office in 2003. Its implementation involves the federal government, states, municipalities and health professionals (Conselho Nacional de Saúde, n.d.).
Farmácia Popular was established in 2004 and is an example of a first-term initiative aimed at access to medicines (Ministério da Saúde, 2023). The objective to preserve is continuity of treatment. A policy can expand coverage while also requiring procurement audits, product availability and assessment of access. Quality of care matters as much as the scale of an announcement.
6.4. Education, skills and science to overcome dependence
Prouni was established by Law No. 11,096/2005. Law No. 11,892/2008 created the Federal Institutes and the Federal Network of Vocational, Scientific and Technological Education. Both belong to the trajectory of Lula’s first two administrations (Brasil, 2005; 2008).
The preservation advocated includes access, support to remain in education and quality. Providing a place or scholarship without the conditions needed to complete the course reduces the policy’s transformative capacity. Education should include scientific skills, critical thinking and links to real problems. Universities, institutes and basic education are complementary: expanding one level does not remove the needs of the others.
International cooperation strengthens autonomy only when the country can understand, adapt and develop technologies. In Ângelo’s proposal, relations with BRICS, Europe or the United States should be linked to training researchers, creating knowledge and building national innovation capacity.
6.5. Quality housing, sanitation and infrastructure
Minha Casa, Minha Vida was created in 2009 and relaunched in 2023, according to government documentation. The PAC originated in 2007 and received a new version in 2023 (MDS, 2023; Iphan, n.d.). The article recommends preserving planning and useful investment, distinguishing that objective from automatic approval of every construction project.
A home needs a suitable location and access to transport, schools, healthcare and opportunities. A road or energy network needs maintenance and impact assessment. Development requires measuring delivery and actual use, including resilience to floods, droughts and extreme events. Investment announcements do not equal money disbursed or completed infrastructure.
6.6. Agriculture, industry and productive capacity
Pronaf was created by decree in 1996, before Lula’s presidency; preserving and improving its role demonstrates precisely that useful policies can endure across administrations (Câmara dos Deputados, 1996). Family farming and commercial agriculture should be assessed by their contributions and impacts, without assuming that domestic food supply, exports and environmental conservation are absolutely incompatible.
Nova Indústria Brasil provides a mission-based framework for production and technology, already described by ABDI. The author proposes that productive support should have verifiable objectives, evaluation deadlines and social benefits. Public financing without learning, competition and accountability can generate subsidy dependence rather than technological capacity (ABDI, n.d.).
Defence-industrial policy should follow the same criterion: building capabilities and meeting legitimate needs under democratic oversight. Productive sovereignty also depends on businesses, workers, research and supply chains; it does not arise from international rhetoric alone.
6.7. Environment, climate and energy security
The PPCDAm was launched in 2004; the Amazon Fund was established in 2008 and its governance was restored in 2023. These references demonstrate a relationship between domestic policies and external cooperation extending beyond BRICS (ICMBio, n.d.; BNDES, 2023; Secom, 2023).
In March 2026, INPE published the consolidated Prodes 2025 figure for the Amazon, at 5,731 km², revising the previous estimate of 5,796 km². This example matters for information quality: monitoring and technical revision must be preserved, including when they do not confirm previously released figures (INPE, 2026).
Within the advocated agenda, protecting forests and water also protects productive conditions, food security and climate adaptation. The energy transition requires assessment of costs, local impacts and security of supply. Conservation and development should be discussed through concrete solutions, with participation by affected communities.
6.8. Stability, responsibility and oversight institutions
Social protection loses effectiveness when inflation erodes incomes or resources are insufficient to maintain services. The author therefore proposes preserving price stability, responsible debt management, spending quality and predictable investment. These objectives do not determine a single economic policy; they establish criteria for assessing choices and distributional conflicts.
Recognising the Real Plan as an achievement predating Lula reinforces the argument for institutional continuity. Similarly, the 2011 Access to Information Law belongs to the Dilma period and should be preserved for its transparency functions, rather than partisan preference (BCB, n.d.; CGU, n.d.).
Investigating corruption, allowing criticism and publishing data are compatible with defending social policies. Supporting a project cannot mean shielding it from scrutiny. From Ângelo’s perspective, a consistent defence of continuity includes the duty to correct shortcomings and demand results.
6.9. Broad diplomacy and parliamentary commitment
Engagement with BRICS should complement regional integration, Mercosur and negotiations with Europe, the United States, Africa and other partners. A diversification policy is coherent when it applies the principle of autonomy to all relationships without replacing one dependency with another.
Parliament can help maintain priorities, debate costs and monitor results while preserving the freedom to review decisions. The commitment sought by the author concerns the functions of development and sovereignty. Different parties may disagree on instruments while recognising shared needs.
The future of Brazilian politics does not require unanimity. It requires rules allowing competition without the systematic destruction of useful capabilities. Preserving rights, reliable statistics and oversight institutions provides a foundation on which different governments can improve the country.
7. Conclusion
Lula’s confirmed victories in 2002, 2006 and 2022 enabled three terms with distinct contexts and outcomes. Observed economic expansion and recent social improvements provide a basis for serious discussion of continuity without erasing crises, unresolved problems or the contributions of other governments and society.
Brazil’s existential realities raise a question extending beyond the electoral calendar: how can resources, knowledge and international relations be turned into a dignified life and decision-making capacity? Founding membership of BRICS offers a relevant platform for this ambition, but its value depends on Brazilian action and the results achieved.
Gilson Guilherme Miguel Ângelo’s advocacy is directed towards the project of continuing and deepening engagement in BRICS. His preference for Lula follows from that criterion. The author considers Bolsonarism tied to an international orientation inherited from the past; the contrast between the projects is not presented as a judgement of who would be a “good” or “bad” president. It is a choice about the place Brazil intends to occupy in the international order. His more lasting proposal is to bring that commitment into Parliament and have it debated by the left, centre, right and sections of the extreme right without abandoning democratic principles.
The desired future is a Brazil that participates in formulating alternatives, strengthens production and maintains autonomy towards all partners. BRICS can help build that standing. It does not replace the UN, eliminate disagreements or ensure automatic development. Its decisive contribution will be demonstrated when international cooperation generates national capabilities and concrete benefits for the population.
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